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October 1997
Not Otherwise in Default
ROGER BERNHARDT
Everybody knows that prepayment charges are different from late charges. Late charges are
often invalid because they are viewed as penalties imposed on tardy borrowers for failing to
honor their promises to pay on time. Prepayment charges, on the other hand, are alternative
performance clauses, giving the borrower the option of paying ahead of time for some additional
cost, and they are generally valid because they are not penalty or liquidated damage provisions.
Even though the legal standards for the two provisions are different, there is enough facial
similarity between the acts of paying late and paying early to make confusion between them
understandable. (Indeed, an early attempted defense of late charge clauses was that they merely
gave borrowers the option of paying on time for one amount or paying afterward for another.)
Given that background, can a prepayment charge ever be invalidated as a disguised late charge?
If the loan documents permit the borrower to prepay without penalty as long as the borrower has
never been late with a payment, is that a valid prepayment clause or an invalid late charge
clause?
The Ridgley v Topa Thrift Disagreement
This predicament was addressed in Ridgley v Topa Thrift & Loan Ass’n (review granted July
9, 1997, S061765; superseded opinion at 53 CA4th 1177 (advance reports), 62 CR2d 309,
reprinted as modified at 54 CA4th 729 (advance reports)), reported at 20 CEB RPLR 137 (May
1997). In Ridgley, the note provided that the prepayment charge would be waived after the first
six months of the loan “provided that there [had] been no other defaults.” Thirteen months later,
the borrower missed a payment, but he sold the property the next month and paid off the loan
entirely. (The pending sale was the cause of the missed payment and the lender waived the late
charge for it.) Because of that missed payment, however, the lender then imposed a $115,000
prepayment charge.
As a prepayment issue, six months’ advance interest on a $2.3 million loan is perfectly
appropriate. On the other hand, a charge of $115,000 for being late with a monthly payment of
$19,500 has no chance whatsoever of being upheld. So which was this?
For the appellate court majority, the provision was merely a prepayment charge, no less valid
because under other circumstances it was waivable: “[I]f the provision had stated the penalty
would be imposed if there was a prepayment, the provision would have been valid. We conclude
the provision was not made invalid by conditioning a waiver upon a lack of default.” 54 CA4th
at 738. For the dissent, however, this was not a charge for prepayment because the lender, by its
willingness to waive it after six months, “was saying that it would recover enough in interest
payments during that period to compensate fully for lost future interest payments as well as the
administrative costs of negotiating this loan and then replacing it with a new loan from another
borrower for whatever term remained on this loan.” 54 CA4th at 743. The fact that the clause
imposed a fee only if there was a default thereafter made it fall “squarely within the definition of
a penalty or forfeiture which is invalid unless proportionate to the damages sustained.” 54 CA4th
at 743.
The forcefulness of the dissent reduced the comfort that drafters could take from the
majority’s opinion, and now the supreme court has granted a hearing on the matter, which leaves
us all in the dark for the while. Perhaps the high court’s decision will be confined to the technical
prepayment/late charge debate, but it could also trigger a much broader debate among the
justices.

Freedom of Contract or Debtor Protection?
The issue raised by this clause is not one of drafting; in fact, it arises only when the clause is
drafted clearly enough that it plainly applies to the transaction. The issue is whether judges will
permit the clause to operate as it is worded—i.e., whether they will look at its form and see it
merely as a clause that imposes limits on a borrower’s right to voluntarily elect prepayment—or
whether they will focus on its economic effect (i.e., its substance) of imposing a large additional
cost on a borrower for making a late payment. That is really a question as old as mortgage law
itself.
The earliest mortgages gave the lender a present defeasible title (fee simple subject to the
condition subsequent of payment by the borrower), meaning that nonpayment on the due date
enlarged the lender’s title into a fee simple absolute automatically, instantaneously, and finally. It
was only after chancery courts created the equity of redemption that debtors got the right to pay
late, a right that had nothing to do with the language of the instrument. California Mortgage and
Deed of Trust Practice §1.21 (2d ed Cal CEB 1990). To protect that right, the corollary rule
against clogging had also to be imposed, prohibiting the mortgage from including provisions that
waived or impaired the right of redemption. Thus, judges outlaw a lot of clauses. However, to
decide whether a clause is or is not a clog isn’t easy; it requires some kind of economic analysis
of the provision, and that gets you on the slippery slope from prepayment to late charge clauses.
If a deed of trust says that upon the trustor’s failure to make any installment payment on time
the entire loan is entirely due, with no right of reinstatement, it is invalid. If it states that the loan
is for two months, but may be renewed for an additional month thereafter if some payment is
paid no later than the last day of the month, is that also an improper waiver of the right of
reinstatement, or is it the legitimate denial of the conditional privilege of renewing the loan?
How does a court distinguish between a permitted denial of benefits and a prohibited imposition
of burdens? There can’t be a simple answer to that question or else every drafter would know
how to get on the good side of the distinction.
Furthermore, judicial protection is intermittent; a court first has to perceive that a mortgage is
involved, and also has to conclude that the provision involved is unfair (a clog) despite its
wording. Artful drafting (as often occurs with sale-leasebacks and other disguised loan
transactions) may keep judges from realizing that they have a mortgage in front of them, and can
mask the clogging effect of the clauses contained in the document. Prospects are not bright once
the judges know the document is a mortgage and the clause exacts a penalty.
In that respect, the outlook is ominous for the Ridgley lender. The clause it employed made its
effect depend on whether there was any “default,” a word which is a red flag to those concerned
with penalties. Civil Code §2906, for instance, says that an option for the mortgagee to purchase
the mortgagor’s property does not impair the equity of redemption only if it “is not dependent
upon the occurrence of a default.” With a statutory warning like that, a prepayment provision
written to be dependent on default is just asking for trouble. (Especially because a borrower in
bad standing is just the kind a lender ought to want to see paying off the loan early!)
Effect of Tying Everything Together
The “not otherwise in default clause” is now in common use in commercial documents.
Numerous benefits and burdens are imposed on one or both parties, and cross-default and crossacceleration clauses are included so that rights and duties are tied together in ways no one may
have anticipated. Provisions such as partial releases of acreage from blanket loans, further draws
on lines of credit, and options to renew (in loans, leases, or other transactions), to name just a
few, are reflexively made dependent on the absence of defaults in any other respect. That can
easily lend itself to judicial invalidation of any attempted withholding of a concession following

an unconnected default on the ground that it is really a disguised penalty rather than a
conditionally withheld benefit.
For now, attorneys should be cautious in assuring their clients that such clauses may not
always work. They should be even more cautious in interlocking all the provisions of a deal into
one big package. (At the very least—as Pat Randolph, the ABA’s Reporter on California Real
Estate Decisions, has proposed—defaults should be tied only to arrangements that will endure
thereafter, and not to terminating provisions of the loan.) Most of the time these interlocks are
not truly negotiated or really necessary; they are boilerplate that the word processors, rather than
the lawyers, added into the documents. Like the old dragnet clauses that went too far and then bit
back, these blanket clauses may not give the lenders what they really want.

